A Small Primer On Tradecraft

This is a short essay on the subject of espionage and spy-systems as they have been used throughout history. This essay is by no means exhaustive, but is meant to get to the essence of various systems and analyze their strengths and weaknesses. They will be dealt with here in turn:

1. Block Systems:

This is the standard system used by most Western intelligence agencies, and also one of the most obtuse in its structure. It is weak to adaptating to changing situations, and tends to be pretty stagnant in assessing intelligence information from SIGINT sources as well as HUMINT. (Signals-Crypto and Human Intelligence respectfully.) It is generally made up of five directorates: 1. Intelligence, 2. Counter-Intelligence, 3. Domestic/Internal Security, 4.Technical Division, 5. Financial and Administrative. These systems are hermetically sealed from each other by "code-clearance levels," and everyone is cleared to know only that which pertains to their clearance-level on a "need-to-know" basis, i.e. only whatever of that level of clearance relates to their direct function, and maybe that of their small working group. Thus a person will only know a small part of what their own level is involved in, and virtually nothing about what goes on above and only what is necessary regarding the security levels below. Sometimes sensitive information will be given to those on the lowest levels who do not understand it, as those trying to get to it will assume that it is stored in the highest directorates, and thus they will get misdirected. This is why knowledge of even much of what goes on a lower clearance level is shielded sometimes from higher-ups. Superficially, one might think that this is a worthy system, but it has problems. It is vertical and thus vulnerable to horizontal interpenetration by "chain-system" operatives, who sometimes can infiltrate the top once they have information on who they can blackmail or compromise. A better way would be to diversify the top-level throughout all of the levels of the organization, to make the top-level transparent to infiltration, but this is seldom done. The following is the way block systems can be exploited and compromised:

Example: Compromised through the diversion cells of an enemy system:

The enemy sets up diversion cells which target neutral or even friendly elements which would normally be aligned with the Agency being worked against; and makes the Agency think that worthwhile allies are really "double-agents" who have been flipped against them, or were deceptively loyal in the first place. This can be done by distorting systems with "intelligence viruses" that misdirect friendly operatives into behaving like enemies, and being in the company of enemies, thus causing the Agency to move against its own assets. The method is through disinformation; by breaking codes and replacing the directives with bogus information that friends have been turned and are now enemies, enemies are now neutrals or defectors, that suspicious activities and places are now sanctioned etc. This disinformation will cause an Agency to "wet-sanction" and wrongfully interrogate friendly elements; thus causing allies to turn against the Agency, as before said. Another way is through leading the Agency into an engagement of a diversion cell for purposes of distorting their intelligence or for infiltration. Block-Systems are so obtuse, that a small bit of critical disinformation can disrupt an entire agency and waste time and resources. When an Agency engages a diversion cell, this is easy for a diversion cell to do. Also in the act of engaging a diversion cell, the persons involved in the cell can deduce critical information from the directives that are given by the Agency. e.g. Even from a small range of orders, the WHY and HOW of the reasoning can be intuitively ascertained by a diversion cell, and they can figure out aspects of the larger picture. But even without this, as long as they are not found out; they end up becoming part of the Agency's spy-craft designs, which are related to all the others. If the diversion cell just goes off and makes a series of disasterous moves, (even without having all the details of the other activities and plans,) they will throw all the other operations into total chaos, at least related to that particular situation. Also in time when they have figured more things out through the process of being engaged by an agency, they can then find out who can be compromised on that level and having done this; also find out about other willing traitors higher-up that can be exploited through bribery and/or blackmail. Thus they can penetrate the higher levels and compromise activities and information. The classic way of doing this is through phony "defections," thus getting information about an agency and then escaping back to the enemy country. This only works when the defectors seem disinterested in defecting, and have to be persuaded to do so by the Agency. Thus they are less likely to seem that they would re-defect to the enemy or get flipped as a "double-agent," and these types can do a lot of damage. Also disgruntled ex-employees of an agency sometimes with high-level information and a big grudge can be made useful. The cases like the Ames case, Philby, and others, show how vulnerable "Block Systems" can be. Another method when high-level operatives or persons are found out, is to spoof communications to make it look like they are going crazy, or are "loose cannons." Also making them think that others in the agency are plotting against them and making them paranoid and potentially disloyal is another way. Block Systems thus have a vulnerablilty to psychological operations.

2. Chain Systems.

These systems are more complicated, but paradoxically more simple to describe. There is a loose command that is dispersed horizontally all over the world, or over a given area. There are networks of small cells that only know their immediate contacts, and even this is just with cover-identities, or aliases. The commanders who design operations and logistics are never known by anyone, but transmit their directives via SIGINT or cypher; via radio or computer means, or through "dead drops" of hardcopy directives in code at remote locations or drop points. When each group gets their instructions, they act on them within a given area, taking care not to leave their area to do it, so as not to disturb the overall "nexus" of deployment or disrupt the activities of other cells. The strength of this system is that if somebody is caught they only know two or three other people, (and not even their real names,) and nobody from any other cell, and of course not the command in that they are distributed throughout the cells wherein nobody knows that they are really from the command, or these controllers exist someplace else. It is essential that no cell know who command is, who the other cells are, (other than not to intrude in their geographic area,) and also not know the members of their group by their real names. Any flaw in these methods breaks the chain. These systems are almost impossible to infiltrate and disrupt, in that no cell system should be working on something that cannot be taken up by another cell-system rapidly, in the event that a cell is neutralized or disrupted. Then a new cell must be mobilized from all or some of the others to activate in the area where the previous cell was destroyed, and take up where the other left off. What is important in this case, is that even though the goal may be similar, the methods and tactics need to change and thereby be in no way predictable by the enemy. This area will be very "hot" with surveillance and so methods and tactics have to change in this case. The only real weakness of chain-systems is that the command can be "spoofed" by the enemy forces and thus disrupt cells with bogus deployments and data set up to compromise them. Dispersing the command through the cells where the command members are unknown to cell members and as much as possible unknown to each other, is the only countermeasure. The only point of cohesion that should be linked together should be the overall logistics and plans, but in a way where nobody, not even the command, has the whole picture. Just enough of it to know when and how, and more importantly by who, the picture has been compromised, so as to remedy the situation.

3. Totally Decentralized Proliferation: (Leaderless Resistance)

This is almost the same as a chain-system, but more decentralized and without even an "ad-hoc" command system. They operate by "three-man cells," which then recruit a fourth, the "fourth man" thus creating a new "three-man cell," which recruits a fourth, who then starts a new cell, ad infinitum. Thus cells proliferate like cancer-cells in the existing society. The cells seperate at each point of creation and have no further contact, as when biological cells divide and drift away. The cells go their own way never to meet again, (and they should not) and even the members of each cell do not know each other by their real names. The purpose of each cell is simply to foment disruption through independent vanguard actions, and through generating the artifacts and modes of social corrosion by engaging in disruptive activities and generating divisive propaganda. Aside from vanguardism, which is often impossible, the idea is for these subversive cells to be like termites, nibbling away at the social structure imperceptably until it comes crashing down. Extreme kinds of propaganda of all kinds; Right-Wing, Left-Wing, Anarchist, Libertarian-Agorist, Militia Consitutionalist, Conspiracy Theories, Non-Ideological-Radical-Decentralization, Anti-Statism, Aesthetic Nihilism, etc. The ideology does not matter. The only thing that matters in effective disruptive propaganda is two things:

Content and ideology is merely a clothing disguising the two aims above.

This concludes this essay.